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Editorial Overview:
in this issue
Recently we overheard a colleague respond to news of an
evolving social horror by saying, Do you mean I have to worry about
that? An annoyed peer responded caustically that of course she
must, if she were even to pretend to a social conscience.
Our colleague’s distress at having to worry about a social injustice
had nothing to do with a lack of social conscience: her dilem
ma was simply that there were so many events and conditions
worthy of concern.
While the contents of this magazine issue reflect a multi
tude of disturbing stimuli in our contemporary environment,
we trust that in most cases our authors have included some
possible positive action, optimistic suggestions, or at least in
tellectual routes which can help us come to terms with what
we are having to worry about.
Professor Bill Whitaker and his Honors class took a long
hard look at a wrenching problem: they touched hunger in
Maine. They explored its faces and its manifestations. Bill’s
students are a lesson to many of us as they turned from
shocked awareness to obtaining data, analyzing the situation,
and in some cases, moving to careers to help ameliorate it.
Youngsters, too, looked at a stressful problem in our en
vironment: the environment itself. Still wearing the protec
tive coating of childhood’s strict disjunction, they responded
to a public outreach program on pollution by demanding to
know why we adults can’t Stop Pollution Now. Nick Houtman
patiently led them through classroom games to demonstrate
how they could make a difference by taking a long-term view
and working to lessen cumulative problems.
Professor Munson’s scholarly examination of the reasons

for the Iranian Revolution brings back recent memories of
a stunned nation keeping vigil for U.S. Embassy hostages. Its
geographical focus pulls our minds reluctantly to other com
plex and no less ugly immediate relationships in the Mideast.
Through the courtesy of Professor Michael Palmer, we
have also included in this issue a joyous celebration of
intellect — for us a homecoming to the demanding and deli
cious study of Thucydides’ observations of the Peloponnesi
an War. For Thucydides a world war, the conflict endured for
most of his adult years. The analyses, questions, and penetrat
ing quickness of his mind are unparalleled in political
thought. Soberingly enough, they are specifically germane
to our times.
The Professors Garsombke have presented us with a prac
tical and economically relevant analysis of small business in
Maine. As we watch our state’s economy encounter difficulty,
their words offer windows on the relationships between the
use of technologies and productivity.
And finally, we have introduced another writer, Jamie Wat
ler, who is a graduate student in the sciences, specifically zool
ogy. She is deeply interested in communicating the myster
ies and the wonder of knowledge. We think she has promise,
and we hope to see more of her work.

Fall in Maine.
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Carole J. Bombard
Editor

Human conduct matters: it has an acute, as well as cummulative, impact on our home planet.

The vehicles used to disseminate this messagefrom the University ofMaine varyfrom active
recognition of Earth Day to instigation and current participation in Coastal Cleanup weeks,

from prototype recycling projects to energy regeneration with salad bar scraps and animal
waste. Each project sings the lessons of environmental awareness: each assigns accountabili
tyfor actions. And the most receptive audience is thefuture: the youngsters who will inherit
the promise of environmental cinders or environmental prosperity.

Save the Planet... please
by Nick Houtman

I knew I had gotten my message across when Jeremy, who
is nine, pointed to the oily water in the gallon jar and asked,
“Now what are you going to do with that, Mr. Houtman?”
I didn’t know exactly, but Jeremy had gone to the heart of the
issue.
I had been talking with Jeremy and his fourth grade class
mates about water quality. The message was simple: water
contains many dissolved natural substances, but it also can
be polluted by people. To demonstrate, I had the youngsters
put on various occupational hats from street sweeper to farm
er to sewer plant operator (their favorite). We filled ajar with
clean water from the tap. Each student took a turn talking
about what he or she might inadvertently put into a stream,
a lake or the groundwater during the course of a work day.
Then came the best part. The students got to toss a little
dirt or oil into the jar. In fact, we had a whole range of materi
als to add: dishwasher detergent, soy sauce, ammonia, car
penter’s chalk, soda and sand. Each stood for real pollutants
(such as pesticides or industrial solvents) or nutrients. Each
new addition brought cheers or cries of disgust from the stu
dents, some of whom took pleasure in dumping more than
their share and watching it swirl through the jar. The result
was predictable. The recently-clean tap water had become a
dark liquid which resembled black mayonnaise from the bot
tom of Boston Harbor.
Of course, water pollution is not new, and students need
to know more than that it happens. They need to know how
it can be corrected and who is going to pay the bill. So we
played another game in which the students get $100 to spend
for two purposes: preventing water pollution and making
some capital improvement to their businesses. To their cred
it, the students realized that they could often accomplish both
ends with the same monetary investment.

Nick Houtman is Natural Resources Communicator in the Environmental
Studies Center at the University ofMaine. He earned his Master’s degree
in Water Resources Management at the University of Wisconsin-Madison,
and his work interestsfocus on waste management, sludge utilization, and
groundwater protection.

EARTH DAY, 1990, depicted by Brandy Cameron,
grade 5, Fairmount School, Bangor.
Jeremy and his classmates are eager to SAVE THE
PLANET, and they wonder why we can’t just change our
habits —right now. Their question is a legitimate one. Jere
my and his classmates learned that putting in place the
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FRED THE CLAM, the creation of Gretchen Perry, has
a good deal to say to humans on Earth Day, 1990. Gretch
en is in fifth grade at Harpswell Island School in Maine.
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mechanisms to prevent water pollution takes time. Prevent
ing water pollution takes more than new laws; it takes cooper
ation from workers on the factory floor as much as from cor
porate boards of directors. It takes research to identify the
mechanisms by which pollutants affect the environment; it
takes research to understand the sometimes subtle interac
tions between the water in our lakes and the soil underfoot.
These are tough lessons for fourth graders.
Oh yes, I did take care of the dark liquid created in the
fourth grade classroom. It went into a pile of leaves where I
trust the decomposition process will answer Jeremy’s origi
nal question.

Nick Houtman does water quality sessions on re
quest within a 25-mile radius of Orono. The unit as
currently written targets eight-to-ten-year-olds, but
Houtman can adapt it for other age groups. Hout
man says, “This audience is critical. By speaking
with children, I can promote awareness of the
University (of Maine’s) role and give them (students)
a proper context in which to interpret the headlines.
I also try to put some humor and enjoyment into the
science and thus stimulate an interest in scientific
careers.” While the results of the program are sim
ple enough to quantify, the program’s long-range im
pact is difficult to ascertain. However the ultimate
outcome is judged, teaching the children is an ap
propriate avenue to approach the future.

Mr. Houtman may be contacted at 207/581-1491.

Research and Public Service
Recognizing Leadership,
Pioneering, and Productivity

PUBLIC SERVICE —Herb Hidu, master of accom
plishing what prevailing wisdom insists can’t be done, was
the recipient of the 1990 Presidential Public Service
Achievement Award at the University of Maine. Hidu,
whose strongest achievements are in aquaculture, is inter
nationally known for his work in polyploidy, especially
as the pioneer for its commercial applications.
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DISTINGUISHED RESEARCH - Stephen Norton,
recipient of the 1990 Presidential Research and Creative
Achievement Award at the University of Maine, has for
more than two decades at Maine turned his trained scien
tific mind to making sensible connections between and
among complex data. Building on the rock-solid founda
tions of Geological Sciences, Norton has used the vehicle
of collegial cooperation to make distinct inroads on the
questions of radon, lake eutrification, geochemistry, acid
rain, climate change and watersheds. His work has been
especially effective at pulling the separate disciplines to
gether and elucidating the crucial impacts they have on
the life and health of human beings and their home planet.

“Before I became involved in this hunger research
project, I considered hunger to be a problem isolated
to poor, third world countries. It was something I
was estrangedfrom, occurring in landsfarfrom my
own. After taking a class researching the many dy
namics of hunger, I began to realize that victims of
hunger were not sofar away. Hunger, though often
hiddenfrom view, is a serious problem existing right

here in Maine. Visiting a soup kitchen, writing to
and talking with many individuals involved in hun
ger issues—and paying closer attention to my own
surroundings have sensitized me to the plight of
Maine’s hungry. Yet hunger is an issue that I believe
we can tackle and solve. With lots ofhard work and
effort, I know we can make a difference.”
—Diane Roy

Private Assistance for Maine’s Hungry
by William H. Whitaker
and Jean M. Andrews
Hunger is no stranger to Maine. In late 1983 New England
physicians documented the presence of hunger in Maine in
public hearings in Portland, Bangor and Augusta and in visits
to the homes of the poor in South Paris, Casco, Naples,
Lewiston, and Brunswick. (Citizens’ Commission on Hun
ger in New England, 1984)
As public awareness of the existence of hunger in Maine
grew, churches and other voluntary organizations responded
with major increases in private food assistance. Existing or
ganizations expanded their efforts; in communities through
out the state new food pantries were organized to distribute
groceries to be taken home by the hungry; in larger commu
nities, for the first time since the Great Depression of the
1930s, soup kitchens were organized to provide prepared
meals for consumption on site.
Unlike many other nations, the United States carries out
no effective monitoring of the nutritional status of its citizens.
Many studies of hunger by congressional committees, citi
zen organizations, and advocates during the 1980s indicate

William H. Whitaker is Associate Professor ofSocial Wark at the Univer
sity ofMaine. He earned his B. A. and M.A. degrees in Sociologyfrom
Ohio State University, his M.S. W in Community Organizationfrom At
lanta University, andhisPh.D. in Social Welfare Planningfrom the Bran
deis University Florence Heller Schoolfor Advanced Studies in Social Wel
fare. Prior to coming to Maine, he spent ten years working with low income
grass-roots citizens’organizations in Columbus, Ohio. He has been recog
nized as a Danforth Fellow and Danforth Associate and is actively involved
in and conducting research on the anti-hunger movement in the United States.

Jean M. Andrews is an undergraduate honors studentfrom Vinalhaven,
Maine. A senior English major and resident assistant in Cumberland Hall
(a dormitory), she studied in Seville, Spain, during spring semester 1989
through the University of Maine Study Abroad Program. As a consequence
ofparticipating in the honors seminar an hunger, Jean is considering volun
teer service in the Third Worldfollowing graduation.

that hunger is increasing in the United States, but little is
known about the extent of hunger in Maine.
This article reports on the efforts of a group of five under
graduate students in the University of Maine Honors Pro
gram and their instructor, an associate professor of social
work, to take a beginning step toward filling that gap. We fol
low the lead of Cohen and Burt (1989) in defining hunger as
the condition which exists when people are “unable to obtain
a nutritionally adequate diet from nonemergency food
channels.”
The honors seminar brought together a diverse group of
students. Members included Jean Andrews, a senior from
Vinalhaven, Maine, majoring in English; Susan Priest, a
Palermo, Maine, junior in marketing/business administra
tion; Timothy O’Brien, a junior international affairs major
from Presque Isle, Maine; Stephanie Jones, a sophomore
chemical engineering major from Newburyport, Mas
sachusetts, and Diane Roy, a Portland, Maine, sophomore
sociology major. William Whitaker, the social work profes
sor, conducted the seminar.
Our class, HON 302, was one of several honors group
tutorials offered during spring semester 1990. Honors tutori
als provide an opportunity for intensive exploration of specific
themes or topics by small groups of highly motivated students
working closely with a faculty member who is an authority
in their area of interest. The topic of our tutorial seminar was
“Hunger in the United States and the World.”
The seminar involved experiential learning in addition to
extensive discussion of reading assignments and audio
visuals. Course objectives were developed mutually by stu
dents and their faculty mentor. We agreed to examine the
social issue of hunger from a social policy perspective com
paring hunger in the United States with hunger in Third
World nations, and to investigate competing strategies for the
reduction of hunger with special attention to the interdepen
dent roles of governments and private voluntary organi
zations.
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We read about, analysed, and discussed various perspec
tives on the nature and causes of hunger. Each student main
tained a journal in which she or he kept a personal record
of intellectual struggle with the ideas which were being teased
out and examined. In an attempt to understand better the
daily experiences of poor people who constitute the majority
of the hungry, students visited a town welfare office to find
out about general assistance to the poor, perused food stamp
applications, and visited a local shelter for the homeless where
we prepared and shared a meal with residents.
About midsemester the students decided that they were not
satisfied with knowledge for knowledge’s sake alone. In keep
ing with UMaine’s land-grant mission of service to the peo
ple of our state, they began to think about what they could
do to apply the knowledge they were acquiring.
When they learned that no study existed of the extent of
hunger in Maine, we discussed undertaking such a study as
a class project. Such studies reporting on governmental and
private hunger-related activities had been conducted in sever
al other states. Were we successful, results could be shared
with policymakers and the public and might contribute to
public examination of hunger in our own backyard. Soon,
however, the realities of workloads and time remaining in the
semester drew us back to earth. Because of the limited time
available, we decided to focus our efforts on a more modest
agenda that could later become part of a comprehensive
Maine hunger report.

“Hunger comes in manyforms. In Maine it comes
most often in the form of chronic hunger. This is
differentfromfamines we see on television but kills
far more people around the world each year. This sur
vey revealed to me how much private organizations
help to try and solve hunger. It is scary to think what
problems we would have without them.”
—Timothy O’Brien
We chose to investigate the dimensions of the private, non
governmental response to hunger in Maine. After deciding
that we wanted to know the extent to which food pantries,
shelters for the homeless, and soup kitchens were providing
emergency food assistance throughout the state and whether
levels of private, anti-hunger relief were stable, increasing or
decreasing, we developed a survey questionnaire.
We decided to compare levels of relief activity for the
months of January and February this year and last. We in
tentionally chose winter months in which need might be ex
pected to be present but avoided the holiday seasons which
tend to generate unusually generous relief activity. We decid
ed also to request data for all of 1989 in order to understand
better the magnitude of annual private hunger relief activity
in Maine.
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“Most of us are just not aware of the number of
people who are going without adequate nutrition in
our own communities. Through this survey, we
learned a lot about the response of charities in pick
ing up where our tax dollarsfall short. Hopefully,
our awareness will be a first step in helping all of
our neighbors have the freedom to pursue their
dreams, unseized by pangs of hunger.”
—Jean Andrews
With assistance for photocopying and postage provided by
the Honors Program Director, Bill Whipple, we mailed our
questionnaire to 191 Maine private voluntary organizations
which had been identified tentatively as emergency food serv
ice providers.
Seventy-five responses were returned reporting on 55 food
pantries and 20 soup kitchens. Fifty-nine of the 116 organi
zations which did not respond were churches and 30 were
other types of organizations with nothing in their names to
indicate that provision of emergency food was their major
purpose. There were, however, 27 organizations which desig
nated themselves emergency food programs but did not
respond to our questionnaire.
Although some of the nonreporting organizations may no
longer be operating, our figures probably substantially un
derreport the provision of private emergency food assistance
— and, by our definition, hunger in Maine. Nor do we include
the many private programs which provide food assistance
only during holiday seasons. Our survey, nonetheless, docu
ments a large and growing private food assistance effort
throughout Maine.

Food assistance programs
The number of private food assistance programs in Maine
increased substantially during the 1980s. Only 12 of the pro
grams in our survey reported being in operation before 1980.
Twenty-two were begun between 1980 and 1984 while an ad
ditional 32 were established between 1985 and 1989. Twelve
programs —the most in a single year—were initiated in 1986.
Our report separates programs according to whether they
provide prepared meals which are consumed at the program
site (soup kitchens, shelters for the homeless) or provide
groceries which are taken home for meal preparation (food
pantries — sometimes called food shelves or food banks).
The 20 soup kitchens and shelters which responded to our
survey reported serving a total of 645,431 meals during 1989
at a cost of $172,530. During January and February 1990 they
served 80,852 meals, an increase of 80 percent over the 44,870
meals served during the same period in 1989. Reported costs
increased only 18 percent, reflecting the substantial amounts
of food which are donated to these programs by churches,
businesses, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and
others.

Meals Provided by Maine Soup Kitchens and Shelters for the Homeless
1-1 to 2-28-90
1-1 to 12-31-89
1-1 to 2-28-89

Breakfasts
Lunches
Dinners
Total meals*
Reported cost

39,485
120,293
416,106
648,431
$172,530

5,013
31,928
3,261
44,870
$20,219

9,056
58,003
12,793
80,852
$23,863

'Totals do not add up because not all reported meals were designated as breakfasts, lunches,
or dinners.

The 55 food pantries responding to the survey reported dis
tributing 40,088 boxes of food during 1989 at a cost of
$200,746. They distributed 8,948 boxes of food during Janu
ary and February 1990, an increase of 44 percent over the
6,233 boxes distributed during the same period in 1989. As
sociated reported costs, however, increased by 96 percent to
$40,495 for the two-month period.

Food Boxes Distributed by Maine Food Pantries
1-1 to 12-31-89
1-1 to 2-28-89
1-1 to 2-28-90

Boxes of food
Reported cost

40,088
$200,746

6,233
$20,645

8,948
$40,495

Sources of food assistance
The food distributed by the soup kitchens and pantries comes
from both public and private sources. More than two-thirds
of the 57 programs answering this question reported receiv
ing donations of food or cash from the general public. Almost
three-fifths reported contributions from parishioners or church
organizations. One-third received surplus commodities and
other support from the federal government through the Fed
eral Emergency Management Agency or the United States
Department of Agriculture. Commodities received from fed
eral sources included flour, beans, peanut butter, corn meal,
canned pork, and powdered eggs. About one-fifth of the or
ganizations reported benefitting from food drives and hun
ger walks conducted by the Boy Scouts, students, or Church
Sources of Food and Cash for Maine Soup Kitchens and Food Pantries
(57 food assistance programs reporting)
Number of organizations Percentage
Source
Donations from the public
Parishioners and church orgs.
Federal government (FEMA, USDA)
Good Shepherd Food Bank
Food drives and hunger walks
Businesses
United Way & UW agencies
Miscellaneous organizations
Hand to Hand/Maine
Ending Hunger Week
Community action program
Town welfare

39
34
19
18
11
8
5
4

68.4
59.6
33.3
31.6
19.3
14.8
8.7
7.0

2
1
1

3.5
1.8
1.8

World Service/CROP. Most organizations reported receiv
ing food and other support from two or more sources.
Almost a third of the programs reported purchasing food
through the Good Shepherd Food Bank in Lewiston. For the
past ten years the Good Shepard Food Bank has helped feed
Maine’s hungry by redistributing good food which for a va
riety of reasons cannot be sold by the food industry. Food pan
tries and soup kitchens purchase the food at reduced prices
from the food bank and distribute it to those in need. One
program reported that through careful shopping at Good
Shepard it is able to provide to the hungry about eight dol
lars worth of food for every dollar received in donations.

Staff
Slightly more than a quarter of the organizations answering
our questionnaire said that they employ paid staff. These tend
to be organizations such as the Salvation Army in which food
assistance is part of a larger program. Ninety-five percent of
the reporting organizations involved volunteers in their work.
Both staff and volunteers work from two to 40 or more hours
a week in the food assistance programs.

Access
The majority of the responding organizations reported be
ing available to provide assistance five to seven days each
week. Few, however, were open more than ten hours per
week. Twenty-one programs reported that they are the sole
source of food assistance for the people they serve, while 45
others indicated the availability of additional sources of as
sistance. Several programs stated that they are the last re
sort for the people they serve. The programs reported that
people travel from one to 25 miles to use their services.
Most of the programs have no formal eligibility require
ments, an important distinction from the income-based
means tests of public programs such as Food Stamps, School
Lunch, and WIG (the special supplemental feeding program
for women, infants and children). Especially among the re
ligiously based programs, there is a tendency to trust appli
cants and assume that anyone who seeks food has genuine
need for it. Regarding possible abuse of their services,
representatives of one program stated that they would rath
er get burned than turn away someone in need. Another in
dicated that a person’s conscience is the only limiting factor
in receiving aid. A third stated that no proof of need is neces
sary since “hard times come to anyone at some time in their
lives. We’re just here to help them when they need help.” Only
four programs reported instances in which applicants were
perceived as abusing their trust. In one instance applicants
were asked to “search their souls and decide for themselves
whether or not they were truly in need.”
Some programs used eligibility standards including men
tal illness, local residence, unemployment, sobriety, proof of
having applied for food stamps, current refugee status, speak
ing with a church elder, proof of identification, senior citi
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zen status, being a guest at the program’s shelter, proof of
receiving some form of government aid, and vouchers signed
by a pastor of any church.
A majority of the programs set no limit on the number of
times a person may receive assistance. Others, because of re
source limitations or to discourage dependency, limit their
help. Of 50 programs reporting, 8 limit assistance to once a
month, 5 help only one to four times per year, and 4 aid only
in cases of emergency such as fire or illness. Two programs
reported offering financial counseling to applicants return
ing more than twice, and one program reported investigat
ing anyone seeking its help more than once.
Nearly 90 percent of the programs reported that they have
never denied a request for food. If unable to respond them
selves, they refer applicants to other potential sources of as
sistance. Eight programs reported denying 35 requests in the
first two months of 1990 compared with 55 requests in the
same period of 1989. These programs reported a total of 230
denials during all of 1989. Most denials were attributed to
insufficient resources.

Who are Maine’s hungry?
We asked the programs to identify the percentage of the peo
ple they served who were families with children, couples with
out children, single individuals, and persons over sixty years
of age. In the past, private emergency food programs served
primarily those single individuals and couples without chil
dren ineligible for publicly funded or mandated programs
such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),
Food Stamps, Unemployment Compensation, and Workers’
Compensation. Today the story in Maine has changed dra
matically. Our findings indicate that for many Maine fami
lies with children and for growing numbers of Maine’s popu
lation over 60 the federal/state social welfare safety net has
become increasingly inadequate.
Of the 65 food assistance programs reporting, only 14 in
dicated that single individuals or couples without children
constituted the largest group they served. Only 26 programs
served as many as twenty percent single individuals and only
14 included as many as twenty percent couples without chil
dren among their clientele.
Sixty-eight percent (44) of the 65 private food assistance
programs in Maine which answered this question reported
that families with children constituted their largest service
group. Eighty-two percent (53) of the programs counted more
than 20 percent families with children among those they aided.
Twenty-three (35 percent) of the programs reported serving
over 70 percent families and children!
Persons over sixty years old constituted a majority of the
clientele served by eight programs and made up 20 percent
or more of the clientele of 11 others.
Maine private food assistance programs report increasing
need among women, families with children, the elderly, and
the working poor. For many parents raising a family through
8

full-time low-wage employment or part-time employment
supplemented by AFDC and food stamps, food supplies simply
run out before the end of the month—month after month. Twenty of 51
programs reporting discernible patterns of need noted such
end of the month increases in the numbers of families seek
ing private assistance in their attempts to make ends meet.
Thirty-three programs cited winter as another time of spe
cial need when increased heating costs reduced the amount
of money available for the purchase of food. Five programs
listed summer—when children no longer receive school
lunches and when donations to feeding programs tend to
decline — as a time of special concern.
The homebound elderly, retired widows and widowers,
homeless youths, refugees, veterans, persons laid off because
of illness or injury, unmarried couples, and persons unable
to find work were others reported in growing numbers among
those needing private assistance.

“Over the course of this semester I’ve come to view
hunger in a new perspective. I always used to think
of hunger as only happening in Africa and Third
World Nations. Now I am able to see hunger as it
really is, a growing problem in our state and nation.
As we’ve discovered, hunger affects all types ofpeo
ple for various reasons and is a reality that we all
must see and begin to combat”
— Stephanie Jones

The assistance programs noted increases in negative feel
ings and depression among their clientele and more recur
rence of need. They also reported increasing numbers of in
dividuals making continuing efforts to achieve self-reliance.
Private food assistance efforts in Maine are a cause for
celebration and a cause for concern. Many organizations and
hundreds of volunteers throughout the state have translated
their caring about the plight of the hungry into action. Feed
ing programs have been started, maintained, and expand
ed. The amounts of food and resources made available have
increased dramatically with private cash contributions in 1989
exceeding $373,000.
It is nonetheless clear that private efforts cannot continue
indefinitely to shoulder an increasing share of the responsi
bility for feeding hungry Mainers. In total, the voluntary anti
hunger efforts in the United States during the decade of the
1980s equalled only about one-tenth of the Reagan adminis
tration’s cuts in publicly funded programs for the poor. The
existence of growing numbers of hungry individuals, fami
lies, and children in our state is a public shame to which pri
vate programs are an important response but only a partial
solution.

“In my discipline, business administration, not
much emphasis is placed on the individual. This class
has afforded me the opportunity to look at the world
in a different perspective. I never realized the mag
nitude of the problem until I cameface toface with
the victims and the organizations that try to help
them.”
— Susan Priest
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The Ugly Faces of Hunger
Hunger has many faces. Throughout the world it is reflect
ed in famine, chronic undernutrition, and homelessness; as
disease among the poor, and as anorexia and bulimia among
the affluent. From a global perspective there is general agree
ment that up to a billion people, twenty percent of the world’s
population, daily face the prospect of inadequate food sup
plies, lack of access to food, or inability to absorb and retain
sufficient nutrients. (Kates, 1987) Preventable malnutrition
related deficiencies in vitamin A, dietary iron, and iodine
respectively result in an estimated 250,000 children world
wide becoming blind or partially blind each year, in reduced
health and work performance for millions of adults, and in
widespread risk of mild to profound mental retardation.
(United Nations, 1987) In the United States it is estimated
that at least 20 million people — the majority children — are
hungry at least part of every month. (Physician Task Force
on Hunger in America, 1985)
What we call hunger in the United States differs in impor
tant ways from conditions in many parts of the world that go
by the same name. Efforts to reduce and eliminate hunger
at home and abroad must take into account different types
of hunger and their varied causes. Robert Kates and his col
leagues in the Brown University World Hunger Program
(1987) distinguish among three significantly different hun
ger conditions — regional food shortages, household food pov
erty, and individual food deprivation.

Regionalfood shortages caused by natural disaster, war, and civil
war may lead to famine and starvation. During a regional
food shortage, not enough food is available locally to meet
the nutritional needs of local residents. Such shortages con
tinue to threaten Ethiopia and other parts of sub-saharan
Africa and the Third World. Similar shortages contributed
to the exodus of hundreds of Mainers in 1817 following the
“year without a summer,” “eighteen hundred and froze to
death.” (Stommel, 1983) Regional food shortages are no longer
a problem in the United States.
Householdfood poverty, the most frequent form of hunger in
the United States, occurs when people cannot afford to buy
food which is available or lack access to the resources neces
sary to raise food themselves. Household food poverty is re
lated to lack of access to land, to inadequate wages, and to
inadequacies in programs such as public assistance, food
stamps, and social security.
A third type of hunger, individual food deprivation, is caused
by disease which affects the ability of people to use the
nutrients they consume, by unmet special needs such as the
nutritional requirements of pregnant and nursing women, or
by neglect, abuse, or discrimination within families or house
holds. In certain cultures, for example, females eat only af
ter males have been satisfied. Anorexia and bulimia among
college students are other examples of individual food depri
vation.
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Explaining the Iranian
Revolution
by Henry Munson, Jr.
Why did an Islamic revolution occur in Iran in 1978-79? One
commonly accepted answer to this question is that the Shah
“modernized too fast.” But this explanation of Iran’s revolu
tion is inadequate.1 University students in engineering and
other applied sciences were among the most active par
ticipants in the Iranian revolution. Such people were clearly
not opposed to technological modernization, nor do we find
opposition to technological modernization (including indus
trialization) in the writings of the Ayatollah Khomeini and
the other theorists of the revolution.
Khomeini and many of his supporters were of course out
raged by social modernization as represented by the
secularization-cum-westernization of Iran during the reign
of Muhammad Reza Shah (1941-1979). But the existence of
this outrage does not explain the revolution of 1978-79. Tradi
tional Iranian Muslims have complained about seculariza
tion and westernization for more than a century - as have
traditional Muslims elsewhere. But an Islamic revolution oc
curred only in Iran and only in 1978-79.
One might argue that the pace of social modernization un
dertaken by the Shah in the 1970s greatly exceeded that un
dertaken anywhere else at any other time, but that was not
in fact the case. The innovations effected by the late Shah’s
father, Reza Shah, in the 1920s and 1930s violated the val
ues of traditional Iranians far more drastically than anything
the Iranian, government did in the seventies. Reza Shah
stripped the (llama, or Islamic scholars, of many of their tradi
tional economic and legal prerogatives and forced both men
and women to wear western clothes. These various attempts
to emulate the West infuriated many Iranians. But Reza Shah
easily suppressed the scattered protests sparked by his re
forms. There was no Islamic revolution during Reza Shah’s
reign (1925-1941).
It is true that Iran experienced a massive influx of wealth
in the wake of the OPEC price increases of the early 1970s,
but all the OPEC countries were transformed by this wealth,
not just Iran. From 1970 to 1977, both Iraq and Saudi Ara
bia had higher rates of economic growth than did Iran. Yet
the regimes in both these countries easily suppressed their

Henry Munson, Jr., is Associate Professor ofAnthropology at the University
ofMaine. He earned his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago and has
had two books published by Yale University Press: The House of Si
Abd Allah: The Oral History of a Moroccan Family (1984)
and Islam and Revolution in the Middle East (1988). He is
presently writing a book about the political role of Islam in Morocco.
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“fundamentalist” opposition. Many other OPEC countries
with economic growth rates almost as high as Iran’s 10 per
cent increase in per capita GNP (1970-1977) experienced very
little turmoil during this period. Thus the argument that
Iran’s revolution was the result of “overly rapid” economic
growth induced by the OPEC price revolution is less than
convincing.
Those who contend that rapid modernization caused the
Iranian revolution often cite massive rural-urban migration
as a disruptive force that “uproots” people, subjects them to
“anomie,” and induces them to join “fundamentalist” revolu
tionary movements. The problems with this argument are
fairly obvious. First of all, anthropological studies of ruralurban migrants in Iran, as in the Third World generally, have
shown that the rural-born urban poor have generally not par
ticipated actively in “fundamentalist” movements or in polit
ical movements of any other kind. These people usually lack
secure livelihoods. They are typically laborers, peddlers, ser
vants, or unskilled factory workers. And they often live in
squatter settlements. Such people are primarily concerned
with their daily struggle for food and shelter. They may riot
when the price of basic foods is suddenly raised; they rarely
if ever constitute an important social base for revolutionary
movements. And they have never been effectively mobilized
by the “fundamentalist” movements of the Islamic world,
which have drawn most of their support from students and
the educated middle class.
As for the alleged “uprooting” and “anomie” of rural-urban
migrants, it is an illusion. Anthropological studies of the ruralborn urban poor throughout the Third World as well as in
Iran have shown that such people live surrounded by rela
tives and neighbors from their own villages or similar ones.
While urban life does undoubtedly differ from the life of a
peasant or shepherd, migration from village to town does not
usually entail a traumatic cultural shock because migrants
remain among people like themselves.
It is true that the urban poor of Iran did eventually par
ticipate in the mass marches of the Islamic revolution, but
they only did so on a large scale in the late fall of 1978, by
which time the Shah’s regime was clearly doomed. There had
been some clashes between squatters and the police early in
the fall of 1977, but these were simply responses to govern
ment attempts to raze some of Tehran’s squatter settlements.
They involved men and women trying to stop bulldozers from
destroying their homes rather than revolutionaries trying to
topple a regime. Such incidents did not endear the Shah’s re
gime to the urban poor, nor did they transform them into
‘Sources and further data concerning this issue can be found in my book
Islam and Revolution in the Middle East (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1988).

revolutionaries committed to the Ayatollah Khomeini’s goal
of an Islamic state.
A related problem with the conventional emphasis on mas
sive rural-urban migration as a cause of Iran’s revolution is
that such migration is occurring throughout the Islamic world
and throughout most of the Third World generally. From
1970 through 1981, Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Saudi
Arabia, and the Sudan all had higher rates of urban growth
(partly due to rural-urban migration) than did Iran. None
of them had an Islamic revolution.
One could argue that the Shah brought about his own de
mise by his expansion of Iran’s educational system since the
students and recent graduates of this system played a central
role in the revolution of 1978-79. But once again, Iran did
not differ from the rest of the Islamic Middle East insofar as
the expansion of education was concerned. In fact, the educa
tional systems of a number of other Middle Eastern coun
tries expanded more rapidly in the 1970s than did that of Iran.
The argument that Iran’s revolution occurred because of
the Shah’s authoritarian rule runs into similar problems. The
educated Iranian middle class and students were indeed out
raged by the lack of democracy and the Shah’s abuse of hu
man rights. Such outrage existed, in the late 1970s, through
out the Islamic world, yet only Iran had an Islamic revolution.
Another frequently invoked explanation of the Iranian
revolution involves the frustration of expectations heightened
by the boom following the OPEC price hikes of the early
1970s. This boom led to high inflation, as much as 50 per
cent a year from 1975 to 1977, according to some sources.
(Government statistics in this regard are not entirely relia
ble.) The Shah’s government then initiated an austerity pro
gram to reduce this inflation, cutting back on construction
and various other projects and thus causing unemployment
for some workers. There are those who argue that the govern
ment’s austerity program frustrated the expectations height
ened by the boom of the mid-seventies and thus sparked the
revolution. But Iran’s recession of 1975-77 was relatively mild
when compared with the hard times that prevailed in most
OPEC countries when the price of oil dropped sharply in the
early 1980s. The shift from boom to austerity in these coun
tries certainly frustrated a lot of expectations. But there were
no Islamic revolutions in the 1980s.
Another widely accepted explanation of the Iranian revo
lution is that the Carter administration “lost” Iran because
of its emphasis on human rights and its failure to support the
Shah as vigorously as it should have. This view can be related
to the general proposition that revolutions only occur when
the ancien regime is perceived to be vulnerable and no longer
capable of suppressing opposition.
As many scholars and former members of the Carter ad
ministration have emphasized, the United States did not in
fact force the Shah to undertake a radical liberalization pro
gram. But the Shah, like all educated Iranians, never forgot
that he owed his throne to the CIA coup of 1953. He feared

that the American government would organize his overthrow
as it had organized the overthrow of Prime Minister Musaddiq after the nationalization of British oil holdings in Iran in
the early 1950s. Indeed, after having had to flee Iran in Janu
ary 1979, the Shah repeatedly accused the United States and
Great Britain of having masterminded Khomeini’s revolution
(see his book^nrwer to History). (Pro-Shah Iranians in Beverly
Hills and Paris never tire of making this assertion.)
When Carter was elected president on November 2, 1976,
the Shah was worried, as he was whenever liberal Democrats
were in the White House. He had already begun to “liberal
ize” his regime in response to congressional criticism of his
regime’s human rights abuses. He now began to tolerate pub
lic criticism of his government for the first time since the early
1960s; Carter’s human rights rhetoric was the main reason
for this. But the Shah also knew he had cancer and probably
sought to placate some of his domestic opposition in order
to facilitate his son’s accession to the throne after he died.
The extent to which the Shah reformed his regime should
not be exaggerated. No criticism of the government was per
mitted in the mass media, which remained firmly under
government control, and reformist political dissidents con
tinued to be beaten and imprisoned. However, during the
course of 1977, Carter’s first year in office, a number of Iran’s
secular reformists were allowed to circulate mimeographed
copies of “public letters” demanding free elections and an end
to torture and arbitrary imprisonment. This gave hope to the
Shah’s more radical opponents, notably the Ayatollah
Khomeini and his followers.
Alexis de Tocqueville once observed that “evils which are
patiently endured when they seem inevitable become intoler
able when once the idea of escape from them is suggested.”
Carter’s rhetorical emphasis on human rights led many Ira
nians to believe that escape from the authoritarian rule of the
Shah was possible. Mahdi Bazargan, the first prime minis
ter of Iran’s post-revolutionary Islamic government, has ob
served that “when Carter’s human rights drive lifted the hope
of the people, all the built-up pressure exploded.”
There were many Iranians who dismissed the Carter policy
as a purely cosmetic endeavor, but there were also many who
interpreted the Shah’s toleration of a modicum of dissent dur
ing Carter’s first year in office as a sign that American sup
port was now conditional rather than absolute. This led many
to perceive the Iranian king as vulnerable for the first time
since the early 1960s.
The aura of invincibility that had surrounded the Shah,
as well as much of the hostility towards him, was due to the general
perception, both in and out of Iran, that he was Washington’s
man. The United States had put him back on his throne in
1953 and the United States would not tolerate his overthrow.
This was the conventional wisdom in Iran. The Shah’s per
ceived subservience to the United States outraged Iranian na
tionalist sensibilities. At the same time, fear of American in
tervention inhibited all those who yearned for an alternative
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mode of government. Carter’s rhetoric diluted this fear and
thereby shook the foundations upon which the Shah’s regime
was based.
While the Carter human rights policy did undoubtedly
precipitate the Iranian revolution, it did so because of the
specific circumstances in Iran. The Carter administration
placed far more pressure on Latin American dictatorships
than it did on the Shah, primarily because of Iran’s strategic
and economic significance. Yet of the various Latin Ameri
can autocrats chastised for their human rights violations, only
Somoza fell. Others, notably Chile’s Pinochet, do not appear
to have been weakened by the Carter administration’s efforts
to force them to reform.
The emphasis on human rights during Carter’s presidency
did not trigger revolutions in South Korea or the Philippines.
(Marcos fell during Reagan’s second term.) Nor were there
revolutions in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, or any of the
other Middle Eastern autocracies supported by the United
States. Only in Iran. In other words, the Carter human rights policy
would not have sparked the Iranian revolution if the situation in that country
had not already been combustible.
Moreover, it is necessary to view the impact of the Carter
policy on Iran in its historical context. Iranian interpretations
of this policy and of the Shah’s “liberalization” were shaped
by the CIA coup of 1953 and the quarter century of Ameri
can domination that followed it. If Iranians had not viewed
the Shah as an American puppet, they would not have inter
preted the Carter policy as a sign that their king was now vul
nerable.
It should also be stressed that President Carter’s adminis
tration did continue to support the Shah until the end of 1978,
by which time he was a prisoner in his own palace. There were
conflicts between Carter’s “hardline” National Security Ad
visor Zbigniew Brzezinski and the more liberal people in the
upper echelons of the State Department. But Brzezinski him
self has noted that “the record does show that the Shah had
enough encouragement from Carter and from me to have
taken - had he wanted to and had he had the will to do so
- the tougher line.”
The implication in Brzezinski’s statement is that the Shah
could have suppressed the opposition by a greater use of force.
Perhaps. But Brzezinski, like many other American observ
ers, overlooks the fact that the Shah did indeed use a great
deal of force in trying to suppress the 1978-79 revolution. All
scholarly and serious journalistic accounts concede that thou
sands of unarmed demonstrators were killed by Iranian po
lice and troops during the revolution.
While it is possible that slaughtering many more thousands
could have suppressed the opposition, one could also argue
that the Shah sometimes responded too harshly. During the
winter and spring of 1978, the revolution evolved out of a cycle
of mourning marches for “martyred” demonstrators killed in
previous demonstrations. Each time people gathered to
mourn their dead, their mourning rites turned into riots, and
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the police and army killed more people, thus creating more
martyrs to mourn, and thus perpetuating the cycle of pro
test. Perhaps if these protests had been suppressed without
death, the cycle might have been aborted. With respect to the
later phase of the revolution (when everyone began to real
ize it was one), the brutal suppression of demonstrations led
many previously neutral Iranians to support the revolution
despite their lack of sympathy for “fundamentalism.” This is
a point often stressed by westernized middle-class Iranians
who fled Iran after realizing what Khomeini meant by “an
Islamic state.”
One problem with the argument that the Shah could have
suppressed the revolution by a greater use of force is that it
supposes the continued loyalty of the Iranian army. Revolu
tions cannot succeed if the armed forces of the ancien regime
remain loyal even when used to slaughter their own people.
To what extent could the Shah count on such loyalty?
It is true that, in terms of outward appearance, the bulk
of the Iranian army remained intact right up to the Shah’s
flight to Egypt on January 16, 1979. However the will of the
armed forces had started to crumble long before this. There
were many acts of insubordination (usually involving refus
al to shoot demonstrators) by soldiers and officers during the
fall of 1978 (see Misagh Parsa, Social Origins of the Iranian Revo
lution, pp. 241-43). This is why the Shah allowed the mass
marches of December to take place after initially banning
them. He could not count on his troops to fire on millions
of unarmed men, women, and children led by the venerated
“clerics” of Islam.
General Gharabaghi, who was in charge of the Iranian
armed forces in January 1979, estimated that at this time the
army was losing about a thousand deserters a day, while about
twelve hundred men were deserting every day in early Febru
ary. On February 9, the Shah’s Imperial Guard attacked a
large military base in Tehran to punish hundreds of air force
technicians who had expressed their support for Khomeini.
Members of several guerrilla groups as well as civilians joined
forces with the technicians. The insurrection spread to other
bases and police stations in Tehran until February 11, when
the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces declared its neu
trality in the conflict between the revolutionaries and the ves
tiges of the Shah’s regime. The Shah’s army, the best-equipped
in the Third World, collapsed.
While the argument that the United States prevented the
Shah from using enough force to suppress the revolution does
not seem very convincing, we have seen that the Carter hu
man rights policy, as perceived by Iranians, did weaken the Pah
lavi regime. But that policy, in and of itself, could not have
caused the revolution of 1978-79. American policy and the
subsequent “liberalization” of the Shah’s regime allowed
hitherto submerged discontents to surface. This would not
have resulted in a full-fledged revolution had it not been for
the symbolic and later actual leadership of the Ayatollah
Khomeini and his “clerical” as well as lay supporters.

Strictly speaking, there are no “priests” in Islam. That is
to say that collective worship does not entail “ordained” in
termediaries. Any pious adult male familiar with the rules of
worship can lead congregational prayer. But very often, such
prayer is led by a man of religion who has studied the Qur2
an and various other basic texts of Islam. In Shi i Islam, which
prevails in Iran, there is a loose hierarchy of such men of re
ligion, at the apex of which are the ayatollahs, or “signs of God.”
The latter are believed to be the deputies of the messianic hid
den Imam, who will return at the end of time. Since the nine
teenth century at least, it has been believed that every Shi i
Muslim in Iran should be the follower of one of these depu
ties of the hidden Imam. Being the follower of such a man
entails paying him an annual religious tax as well as obey
ing all his orders (which usually only concern religious
matters).
In other words, the Shi i ayatollahs have charismatic authori
ty in the sense that they are believed to represent the will of
a divine being - the hidden Imam. Khomeini was able to ex
ploit this authority to a greater degree than any other ayatol
lah in Iranian history. He was able to use his position to mobi
lize millions of normally docile Iranians in a way that no
secular politician could have done.
In addition to his institutional charismatic authority de
rived from his status as an ayatollah and as a “source of imita
tion” to be followed by other Shi is, Khomeini also had greater
charismatic authority than any of his fellow ayatollahs by vir
tue of the nature of his struggle against the Shah. Ever since
he had first condemned the Shah for suppressing Islam and
subordinating Iran to the United States in 1963, Khomeini
had come to be seen as a heroic figure identified with some
of the archetypal mythic heroes of Shi i Islam. He lived sim
ply. He spoke simply. And unlike most Iranians, he was not
afraid to defy the Shah or the United States.
Khomeini articulated nationalistic resentment of Ameri
can influence in Iran in ways that appealed even to Iranians
unsympathetic to his “fundamentalist” conception of Islam.
In 1964, after having been released from prison, he con
demned a new law granting the equivalent of diplomatic im
munity to American advisors in the following terms:
Do you not know that this agreement reduces the Iranian people to a
rank lower than that of an American dog?
Ifsomeone runs over an American dog with his car, he is subject to in
vestigation andprosecution, even ifhe is “the shah” himself. Bui ifan Ameri
can cook runs over “the shah of Iran” himself, or any other important per
son, he will not be subject to prosecution.
On February 18, 1978, Khomeini declared that the Shah had
“transformed Iran into a colony of America.” On September
12, 1979, he said that “for more than fifty years, the Pahlavi
puppet dragged our country down, filling the pockets of the
foreigners - particularly Britain and America - with the abun
dant wealth of our land. ...”
In articulating Iranian resentment of American influence

in Iran, the Ayatollah touched a very raw nerve. While he
tended to fuse this nationalistic resentment with religious
xenophobia, it would be a mistake to reduce the former to
the latter. The Iranian revolution was, among other things,
a nationalist uprising against a regime associated with for
eign domination. In this respect, it resembled the other revo
lutions of the Third World that have occurred since the end
of World War II. This nationalistic aspect of the Iranian up
heaval was reflected in many of the slogans chanted during
the mass marches of 1978, e.g., “We will destroy Yankee power
in Iran” and “Death to the American dog; Shah held on a leash
by the Americans!” The Shah had never been able to over
come the taint of illegitimacy due to his having been returned
to his throne by the CIA. This taint was exacerbated by the
increasingly conspicuous role of Americans in Iran in the
1970s. Despite the fact that most Iranian “ulama (religious
scholars) had actually supported the CIA coup, Khomeini
was able to exploit nationalistic resentment of the American
role in the Shah’s regime far more skillfully than the wester
nized secular intellectuals divorced from the religious sensi
bilities of the people.
Khomeini came to be identified with the hidden Imam.
There were debates in Iran during the revolution as to
whether he was actually the long-awaited hidden Imam him
self or merely his deputy. When Khomeini returned to Iran
after more than fourteen years of exile, one ayatollah joked
that the hidden Imam had not been expected to return on
a jumbo jet (chartered from Air France). Even those who
ridiculed the notion that Khomeini was the hidden Imam had
to acknowledge the messianic aura surrounding him in the
popular imagination (at least in the cities as of the late fall
of 1978).
Khomeini, like most charismatic revolutionary leaders, be
came a symbol that had different meanings to different stra
ta of Iranian society. For the westernized young seeking cul
tural authenticity, he was authenticity. He was the revitalized
tradition for which they yearned. He represented the real Iran
as opposed to the Iran of those who skied at St. Moritz and
bought their clothes in Paris.
For more traditional Iranians, the issue of cultural authen
ticity was less pressing since they had never questioned their
Iranian Muslim identities. Only those who feel inauthentic
are obsessed by authenticity. For more traditional people,
Khomeini was above all a man of God, an idol-smasher, and
the personification of the traditional values denigrated by the
Shah and the westernized elite, all of this enhanced by the
messianic aura.
Khomeini had opposed the Shah since 1963. But the 1963
uprising had failed as had that of the religious students in the
holy city of Qum in 1975. In these cases, the Ayatollah’s
charismatic authority and his articulation of nationalist
resentment were not enough to induce the people of Iran to
revolt against their king. However, in the context of the Shah’s
to page 24
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iological Clocks:
timing is everything—and everywhere
by Jamie Watler

After travelling east through several time zones, the ex
perienced pilot and crew of an airline fall asleep during flight.
A fiddler crab in a laboratory miles from the sea without any
environmental cues persistently becomes active and feeds at
the time of low tide. Leaves of bean plants moving to cap
ture light in the day and folding down at night follow the same
rhythms even in complete darkness. Doctors treating cancer
discover that chemotherapy can be more efficient and less de
bilitating to patients if administered at certain times of the
day.
Is there a relationship among these phenomena? Surpris
ingly yes: they are all examples of biological clocks in action.
Plants, animals, and even single cell microorganisms have an
innate ability to time complex internal and external events
for maximum efficiency, just as people use watches and clocks
to organize our days. Several researchers of the University
of Maine are currently exploring the clock activity of differ
ent animal systems.
In the Psychology Department, Dr. Alan Rosenwasser is
interested in the neural and circadian (approximate 24-hour
rhythm) mechanisms of mice, rats and hamsters. How differ
ent environments or drugs alter the activity rhythms of
animals may provide clues about the effects of altered clock
functions in other systems.
According to Rosenwasser, “There’s a whole lot of data
coming from clinical research showing that in humans with
affective disorders, particularly depression and mania, cer
tain kinds of characteristic changes in their circadian rhythms
occur.”
In humans and other mammals, physiological processes
such as hormone secretion and body temperature exhibit
daily cycles. Individuals with abnormal circadian rhythms
may have these cycles occurring out of phase with their sleep
wake cycle; potentially this could be part of emotional dis
turbance. Rosenwasser noted that it is difficult to determine
the actual cause and effect relationship between the clock and
the disorders by observing human subjects.
Rosenwasser is working to discover more about this rela-
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tionship by examining the effects of drugs involved in depres
sion and mania on the circadian activity rhythms of rats. Ac
cording to Rosenwasser, there is evidence that drugs believed
to promote or alleviate depression in humans cause changes
in activity rhythms of rodents in a manner consistent with
clinical knowledge of human affective disorders.
Even though his research is not immediately applicable to
the human system, “Any fundamental research in mammalian
clocks is in some sense related to things like jet lag and shift
work and those kinds of public health issues.” The biological
clocks in our bodies are normally entrained by environmen
tal or social cues to follow daily cycles. In constant conditions
without these cues, our circadian rhythms persist, but are no
longer synchronized with the external environment and tend
to exhibit a longer cycle which averages 25 hours. This ability
to persist in constant conditions or “free-run” is a hallmark
of all true biological clocks. Therefore, humans and other or
ganisms are equipped with internal clocks which can shift to
accommodate different schedules. But there are limitations.
Large numbers of individuals who work night shifts or
swing shifts or fly over different time zones are at a disadvan
tage: they are working during a time when the environmen
tal cues basically tell the body to go to sleep. This results in
a greater frequency of accidents, lower productivity and
decreased worker happiness. There is evidence that, in many
situations, incorporating the principles of chronobiology into
the scheduling of these workers may alleviate the difficulties.
Rosenwasser believes, “Our society now is entirely depend
ent on 24-hour operation ... a certain number of accidents
are an inevitable consequence of doing that ... we need to
support the research that will help us do that in the most safe
and rational manner.”
The deprivation of sunlight especially in winter months has
been shown to cause symptoms of depression, sleepiness,
weight gain and withdrawal from social activities in some in
dividuals. This seasonal affective disorder (SAD) has been
cured in many cases simply by exposing patients to intense
bright light at certain times of day. An increased understand
ing of the human circadian system and its manipulation may
prove to have a number of therapeutic benefits.
A horseshoe crab, Limulus, although considered a simple
animal, has a circadian clock within its brain that increases
the light sensitivity of its eyes at night to give it excellent vi
sion very close to that of daytime. Dr. Leonard Kass of the

department of Zoology has been exploring the visual system
of Limulus and its associated biological clock to provide insight
of how other systems, including those of humans, may work.

In the eye of Limulus, photoreceptors are much larger than
humans’ or other animals’, which makes them ideal for study
ing retinal function and mechanism. How light energy is
received and passed on as a neural message to the brain and
how the brain of Limulus stimulates increased sensitivity in the
photoreceptors at night are mysteries.
“We try to figure out what nature is actually doing,” said
Kass. “We know that the circadian clock causes neurotrans
mitters to be released next to the photoreceptor cells. We know
that those molecules interact with receptors in the photorecep
tor membrane and that interaction causes changes in intracel
lular functions . . . but we do not know the cellular link be
tween biochemical changes inside the cell and the functional
changes (increased sensitivity to light).”
Dr. Kass is also investigating whether behaviors of Limulus
are being modulated by a circadian clock. “We think it has
an effect on activity cycles,” according to Kass.” It’s quite pos
sible that the circadian clock we are studying in Limulus is very
similar to the circadian clock in ourselves.”
Animals could certainly benefit by utilizing a biological
clock to be at the right place at the right time. While explor
ing the migratory mechanisms of eels, Dr. Gail Wipplehauser
and Dr. James McCleave of the Zoology Department found
evidence that suggested immature American eels in the riv
ers of Maine use a circatidal clock to catch a free ride on the
flood tide, a phenomenon known as selective tidal transport
behavior.

According to Wipplehauser, the immature or glass eels re
main on the bottom of the river during the ebb tide and do
not rise into the water column until the flood tide occurs, thus
preventing the tides from taking them out to sea. In the field,
Wipplehauser tested whether the behavior could have been
caused by the animals detecting the differences in water sa
linity or current due to the tides.
The eels’ behavior did not directly follow these changes,
which indicated that a biological clock may be involved. In
a laboratory free of environmental cues, the eels began to ex
hibit activity rhythms approximately every 12 hours, which
would be a tidal schedule. Does this behavior suggest that the
eels have an endogenous clock? “It certainly seems to be the
case with glass eels,” said Wipplehauser.
“I’d be surprised if . . . lots of fishes and invertebrates that
migrate in coastal waters and in estuaries don’t have a lot of
aspects of their behavior controlled by tidal clocks,” said
McCleave. He also mentioned that circadian clocks may be
involved in other migration systems. “Animals that are do
ing horizontal migration and may be using a sun compass,

or a star compass, need a biological clock so that they can have
an idea where the positions of the sun or stars or moon should
be to get the directional information. There’s lots of evidence
for that in birds and migrating creatures.”
There is now overwhelming evidence that the biological
clock does exist and is found in virtually all lifeforms and subsequendy is conserved evolutionarily. What is this ubiquitous
organic timing mechanism made up of? Do we have any
knowledge of how it ticks and how it communicates timing
to the rest of the body or cell? Do we know how many clocks
are involved? Despite years of research the answer to these
questions is no.

Dr. Harold Dowse and Dr. John Ringo of the Zoology
Department are experimenting with the clock system of the
fruit fly Drosophila to find some answers. In the 1970s, clock
mutants were discovered in Drosophila, mutations in a gene
(called the period or per gene) caused changes in the time
length or period of rhythms involved in activity and eclosion
(when the animals hatch from their pupal cases). This clock
system has a genetic basis and is affected by the per gene prod
uct. By perturbing the system genetically or environmentally
and observing the response of the system to these changes,
Ringo and Dowse hope to learn more about the genetic
properties of the clock and the molecular mechanisms in
volved.
According to their findings, Dowse hypothesized that,
“There isn’t just one clock, but a lot of high-frequency clocks.”
The circadian rhythm is actually a population of the highfrequency clocks and possibly “The product of the per gene
is a coupler of these oscillations.”
Evidence has shown that there are specialized groups of
cells in vertebrates and in other organisms which are master
pacemakers. Many believe that the entire clock system is spe
cifically located within these cells. However, Ringo stated that
both he and Dowse believe that the clock system of Drosophila
is much more extensive and involves all body cells as well as
master pacemaker cells: “There is a perfectly good circadian
clock within each cell, and this clock is the result of intracel
lular coupling by the per gene product. In fact every cell in
our bodies, every cell in the body of Drosophila, has a clock.
These clocks are coordinated by the master pacemakers.”
In terms of evolution, Ringo stated that the idea of in
dividual cellular clocks “Has a lot of appeal because it’s the
simplest hypothesis. It’s easier; you don’t have to invoke a new
type of clock mechanism for multicellular organisms if they’re
the same as unicellular organisms.”
In conclusion, the discovery of biological clocks has in
troduced us to a temporal realm of organization, effects of
which cascade from cellular activities to the outward behavior
of an entire organism. Solving the mysteries involved with this
phenomenon will bring us closer to harnessing it and increas
ing our understanding of its role in life systems.
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" . . Let the narration itself secretly instruct the reader, and more effectually
than can possibly be done by precept”
And that is what it did do
Fifteen women and men, high school teachers ofeconomics, American government, English,

political science, world literature, social studies, and American, Russian, and world history,
met together for an NEH summer seminar.

The textfrom Thucydides’ narrative of the war of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians
served as a vehicle to examine a moral-political climate similar to our own.

Through careful dialogue, prudent discussion, attention to definition, and recognition of
interpretive stages in thought, Palmer prodded and pulled seminar participants away from

strict noncontradiction and toward a sense of intellectual evolution.
While the text provided a common vehicle, the participants’ different disciplines produced
different ways of thinking: an assortment of approaches to the material. The artist-teacher

lookedfor genius and would not analyse; English teachers searchedfor themes, motifs, and

expressions of human nature. History teachers clung to time, places, quantifications. As charac
ters in their own piece, the participants played off against each other, and the results were
synergistic.

Each from a separated-out discipline overlaid with the prejudices of training and train
ers, their personalities, and the conditioning which each had undergone, the participants were
remembering and relearning thinking. They strove to learn, to become tolerant of absent per
fection, to touch the human condition: its outrageous joy and flights of beauty, the insane
depths of horror, cruelty and degradation to which it can sink.
As foci of the writing were studied, participants moved away from the artificial divi

sions superimposed on a metaphysical unity and began to reweave the threads of an ancient
tapestry, a tapestry of synthesis, overlooking, and totality.

Join us as we read excerpts from the abstract of a book by Professor Palmer about
Thucydides, the recorded observations of whomformed the vehiclefor this summer adventure.

Love of Glory and the Common Good:
Periclean Democracy and Athenian Tyranny in Thucydides
by Michael Palmer
Michael Palmer is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University
ofMaine. He earned his Ph.D. from Boston College where his disserta
tion focused on a study of Thucydides, a topic on which he has presented
eight research papers at regional and national conferences. The recipient
of numerous awards, scholarships and professional distinctions, including
an Olin Foundation Faculty Fellowship, Earhart Foundation Summer Fel
lowship Research Grant, a Killam Memorial Postdoctoral Scholarship, and
a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Doctoral
Scholarship, Palmer most recently served as Directorfor the National En
dowmentfor the Humanities Summer Seminarfor School Teachers held in
1990 at the University ofMaine. That seminar used Thucydides’ narra
tive of the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians as a vehicle
for scholarly consideration and analysis ofpolitics and society in their broadest
sense.
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This essay in the political thought of Thucydides investigates
his presentation of the connection between Periclean
democracy and imperialism, on the one hand, and the prob
lem of tyranny, both domestic and foreign, on the other. What
is Pericles’ understanding of the Athenian regime, and what
is Thucydides’ own understanding? What is the Athenians’
understanding of the relation of their regime at home to their
empire, or as Pericles and others call it, their tyranny abroad?
What is Thucydides’ own understanding? What lessons does
Thucydides intend readers to draw out for themselves from
these narrations (to borrow Thomas Hobbes’ formulation)?
The primary original contribution of this book is to eluci
date the relationship between Periclean Athens and the
“tragedy of Athens,” the precipitate decline in Athenian
domestic life that occurred after the death of Pericles. I
elaborate more clearly than has been elaborated heretofore
the many connections between the Periclean understanding

of Athenian democracy and imperialism and the emergence
of the Alcibiadean understanding, which dominates the
generation of Athenian leaders after Pericles. I demonstrate
that the disintegration of Athenian political life after the death
of Pericles, with its disastrous consequences for both the
democracy at home and the empire abroad, was deeply
rooted in deficiencies in the Periclean understanding of pol
itics as presented by Thucydides in the speeches of Pericles.
After preliminaries which outline the reigning approaches
to Thucydides in the scholarly literature and place my book
within the context of that vast literature, the essay examines
Thucydides’ presentation of Periclean Athens. Pericles holds
that the impending war is both necessary and just, and his
war strategy relies decisively on the empire. That war strategy,
designed to secure the empire and even to expand it after the
war, disrupts the traditional manner of living of the Atheni
ans, effectually sounding the death knell for whatever remains
of the ancestral Athenian way of life. Indeed, Pericles’ famous
Funeral Oration, the closest thing in Thucydides to an elabo
ration of “the best regime in speech” of classical political phi
losophy, begins with an attack on the ancestral, and celebrates
the newer Athenian way of life, the pursuit of ever greater
glory from ever greater empire. The glory of Athens rests on
the glory of the empire, an empire over fellow Greeks.
In the Funeral Oration, Pericles describes Athens as a re
gime in which the fundamental tension between the public
good and the private good, a major concern of all political
theorists, dissolves. In Pericles’ view, love of glory is the means
by which human beings can rise above their fear of death and
love of gain, without having to rise above their radical love
of their own. After presenting Pericles’ Funeral Oration, we
might say that in the immediate sequel, the account of the
terrible plague that ravaged Athens and claimed the life of
Pericles, Thucydides presents his own. He takes Pericles’
dream of Athens and turns it into a nightmare. Pericles sug
gests that love of glory could be the foundation of an “ideal”
regime that would reconcile what is highest in the city with
what is highest in the individual; Thucydides’ account of the
plague suggests that fear (ultimately fear of the gods, about
whom Pericles is silent) may be the only compulsion strong
enough to serve as the ground for political moderation, to per
suade us to care about the common good. Thucydides’ “eu
logy” of Pericles raises further questions concerning the
Periclean solution to the political problem.
The essay continues with an examination of the Atheni
ans’ self-understanding and defense of their imperialism. We
begin with the first conference at Sparta where, in the speech
of the Corinthians, an indictment is brought against Athe
nian imperialism. The Athenians who respond to the Corin
thian attack on “Athenians” are appropriately anonymous cit
izens who present a typically “Athenian” view of the empire.
I then compare the genesis of Athenian imperialism given in
this speech with Thucydides’ own account of the events of the
roughly fifty years from the end of the Persian War to the ad

vent of the Peloponnesian War.
In the infamous Melian dialogue, other anonymous “Athe
nians” provide the boldest elaboration of the principles of
Athenian imperialism; these principles are radically chal
lenged by the Melians. We also consider the Athenian debate
concerning the fate of Mytilene, where opposing views of how
the Athenians ought to rule their empire are presented. The
exchange between Hermocrates and Euphemus in debate in
Sicily also casts light on our theme.

World History and Economics, San Jose, California:

Our seminar is exciting and rejuvenating.
Some of my colleagues see prose; others pure
history. Some see it as a vehicle to use with
other writers.
Later on in the essay, we see how the career of Alcibiades
calls into question most forcefully Pericles’ proposed solution
to the political problem. The Athenians are the tyrant city
of Greece and the city whose citizens most fear tyranny. They
seem to be aware, perhaps only in a dim and inchoate way
for most of them, that the principles that justify their domestic
regime are at odds with the principles that inform their for
eign policy, and that their adherence to the latter somehow
poses a threat to the former. This is the context in which Al
cibiades’ problematical relations with Athenian democracy,
and Thucydides’ own judgment concerning these questions,
must be understood. We also chart the Athenians’ destruc
tion in Sicily, in order to observe the extent to which it can
be understood to have resulted, in Thucydides’ own view, from
the disintegration not of the congruence of Alcibiades’ pri
vate good and the public good, but of the disintegration of
the congruence of the private good of Nicias and the public
good. This, taken together with Thucydides’ remarkable eu
logy of Nicias, raises important questions for our understand
ing of “Athenian” politics.

World History, Salt Lake City:

These are bright individuals with exciting
ideas, excellent ideas. The experience isfeed
ing my soul with scholarship.
Readers concerned with contemporary democratic and
world politics will readily see that there are important lessons
for us to draw from these Thucydidean narrations. It has recentiy been remarked that Thucydides is one of the few writ
ers who still commands the attention of both political scien
tists and political theorists, not to mention classicists and
historians. This is undoubtedly a consequence of his much
heralded “realism.” He presents his political theory in the guise
of a vivid narrative of the Peloponnesian War, which was for
to page 24
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Tools of the Trade:
Technology Usage and Financial
Performance in Small Business
by Diane J. Garsombke
and Thomas W. Garsombke

Abstract
New technological advances and increased competition are
spurring greater use and acceptance of technologically
sophisticated machines, equipment, and materials by small
manufacturing firms. This article focuses on three strategic
issues important to small business decision makers: 1) the de
gree and sophistication of the new technology use; 2) the var
ious factors inhibiting technological adaptation; 3) the rela
tionship of these new technologies to positive financial
performance.

Introduction
In the United States, many small businesses follow a tradi
tion of entrepreneurship and the rugged individual’s common
sense approach to business and enterprise. Established by our
founding fathers in New England, this approach states “If it
ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” While this reactive type of manage
ment may have been appropriate in the past, many Ameri
can business owners are being compelled to take a more
proactive stance in manufacturing and operations control. As
Ibm Peters [15] states, the world is changing too rapidly for
anyone to remain complacent. He proposes a new motto: “If
it ain’t broke, you just haven’t looked hard enough. Fix it
anyway.”
American manufacturers are facing technological changes
which force them to consider more cost-effective production

DianeJ. Garsombke is Associate Professor ofStrategic Management and
International Business at the University ofMaine. She earned her Ph.D.
in Business Administration at the University of Tennessee. Currently, her
consulting and research work encompasses strategic planning, competitor
assessments and international exporting, and she recently led seminars in
strategic planning and international business at Kharkov State University
in the U.S.S.R.
Thomas W. Garsombke is Associate Professor ofMarketing and Manage
ment at Husson College (Bangor, Maine), where he also directs the Small
Business Institute. He earned his doctoratefrom Northeastern University
and MBA from the University of Maine. His current work focuses on
advertising and strategic marketing ofsmall businesses and home-based bus
inesses. Both authors have had articles published in journals including the
Journal of Small Business Management. Active members of the
United States Association of Small Business and Entrepreneurship, they
have coauthored two books, Strategic Case Analysis and Interna
tional Business Management.
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systems and operations. The implementation of new technol
ogies is driven by recent computer advances, greater domestic
and international competition, and increased labor costs.
Consequently, small manufacturers, in particular, (due to
their limited resources), must focus on methods to reduce
manufacturing costs, control overhead, improve productivity,
and increase product and service quality.

Background
One of the first major technological changes to influence small
businesses was the introduction of numerical control, which
allows a machine to operate automatically via coded instruc
tion. Numerical controls are of two types: positioning con
trols which are activated by direct data input such as cards,
tapes, or cassettes and affect point-to-point positioning and
computer controls initiated by dials or keyboards which con
trol both point-to-point positioning and the path of the
machine.1
The microcomputer, a smaller, easier to use and less cost
ly alternative to the mainframe computer is pivotal to the
growing trend that Lincoln and Warberg [9] describe as small
businesses enter the high-tech world.2
In small businesses, microcomputers are used predomi
nantly for transaction processing (e.g., listing of customer
names and addresses, items purchased, date of sale, market
ing costs) rather than as decision-making tools in the opera
tions and financial areas (e.g., analyzing inventory levels or
evaluating sales growth) [11] [20],
New usages and applications for small businesses are creat
ed as the technology develops. For example, with the develop
ment of a data base and 3-dimensional graphic technologies,
small businesses can apply existing computer-aided design
and computer-aided manufacturing (CAD/CAM) technol
ogies to materials handling, automatic assembly, product in
novation and office automation [2] [13],
Increased competition (both domestic and international)
is another factor which is accelerating the use of computer
ized tools and machine technology by small- and medium
sized businesses. Some experts characterize the American
economy as “Struggling against fierce Far Eastern Competi
tion.” [3]
As large manufacturers employ industrial robots more ex
tensively, small entrepreneurial firms are buying robots to
compete with larger firms. [8] [12] Stronger financial perfor
mance also has lured small business owners into more exten
sive utilization of computerized processes and systems.
A few empirical studies have been done which show a ten
tative link between the use of technology and financial per
formance. Small firms which use computerized systems for

forecasting and aggregate planning, for example, outperform
those firms that do not employ such techniques. [16] Some
of the activities critical to better financial performance include
analyzing changes in target customers, making sales projec
tions and preparing a monthly cash flow analysis. Small busi
ness can be greatly aided in these planning functions by the
use of computers.3
Interest in new technologies such as information process
ing tools, computerized systems and robotization seems justi
fied from a number of standpoints. These technologies allow
small businesses to reduce costs and improve the efficiency
of their operations because they can bring about better
materials management, smoother customer relations, tight
er control of finances, and greater overall planning for the fu
ture of the firm. [17]
This study examines the linkage between the use of tech
nologies in manufacturing operations and positive financial
performance in small business firms, as well as the relation
ship between technology usage and the number of inhibitors
to implementing new technologies in small manufacturing
firms.

Methods
A current literature review of small manufacturing firms’
technologies, coupled with preliminary interviews of owners/managers of small manufacturing firms, state government
officials, and professional association directors form the back
ground for a series of questions to meet study objectives. The
questions comprise four topical areas.
The first questionnaire section contains a list of descrip
tive indicators which delineate characteristics of seven types
of technology: computerized accounting systems (CAS),
computer-assisted design (CAD), computer-assisted manu
facturing (CAM), computer-assisted production planning
(CAP), lasers (LAS), robotics (ROB), and overall systems
(SYS).
The second section provides factors which might inhibit
implementation of these new technologies. Part three lists per
formance indicators focusing on financial growth, profitabil
ity, and control of operating costs throughout the manufac
turing process.
Small business owners are reluctant to divulge specific
financial data; consequendy, the study employs subjective or
self-reported fluctuations in performance as was utilized by
Dess and Robinson [5] in their study on privately held firms
and organizational performance. Managers report their per
ceptions (on a three-point scale of 1 = below average;
2 = average; 3 = above average) of their firm’s performance vis
a-vis the industry’s performance.
Output (i.e., end results), throughput (i.e., results that oc
cur during the manufacturing process), and overall perfor
mance (i.e., both in-process and end result) are the three
groupings of perceived relative performance. The output
measure is a weighted average of profit margin, sales growth,
return on investment (ROI), market share, accounts receiv

able, and payroll costs. Throughput measures include safety
stock levels, inventory, rework costs, and scrap costs. The
overall financial performance measure is the weighted aver
age of all 10 performance variables.
This study follows the guidelines established by Sapienza,
Smith and Gannon [18] (in their replicate study of Dess and
Robinson) to obtain more reliable subjective measures of per
formance. Namely, the referent group is carefully selected and
defined, respondents are instructed not to adjust their per
formance ratings for organizational goals or a common set
of accounting procedures, and only individuals with direct
responsibility for financial performance measures are includ
ed as respondents in the study.4
For the variables of technology, barriers, and performance,
the respondents are divided into low, medium and high
groups. Cutoffs for these categories are established using the
Delphi Technique, a procedure which uses a panel of expert
judges to make consensual decisions.
The fourth and last section of the questionnaire contains
questions dealing with business-specific characteristics and
data such as annual sales, number of employees, types of
products produced, and ownership forms.

Sample
The study’s target population includes small- and medium
sized manufacturing companies in the state of Maine. The
rationale for a single state sample is fourfold: 1) the authors
were interested in conducting research which would be of eco
nomic benefit to the state in fulfillment of the University’s
land-grant mission; 2) the researchers felt that the response
rate would be higher in the state due to the status of the
University of Maine as the premier research institution; 3)
an up-to-date listing of Maine manufacturers was readily
available for random sampling; 4) previous studies of small
firms have followed the single state sampling technique.
[Liberatore and Titus sampled 169 firms in Pennsylvania (see
footnote 1); Robinson et al. analyzed 81 small firms in South
Carolina (footnote 3); Lincoln and Warberg studied responses
of 303 small business owners in Idaho (footnote 2); Schroed
er et al. examined the new technologies of 20 small manufac
turers located in central and western Massachusetts (footnote
7)-]
The sourcebook, The 1989 Maine Directory of Small and
Medium Sized Manufacturers, lists all manufacturing firms
by SIC Code and county. A random number generator se
lected 300 questionnaire recipients; of these, 144 firms or 48
percent responded.

Results
Characteristics of Firms
A majority of respondents have less than $800 thousand
in sales per year (56%), fewer than 50 employees (64%), and
are incorporated (95%). More than 40 different SIC classifi
cations were represented. Products ranged from mattresses
and springs, canned foods, packaging material, and metal
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fabrication to electronic parts and equipment, printing, and
building materials. Analyses of response and nonresponse
firms showed no significant differences between the two
groups regarding product type, number of employees,
amount of yearly sales, and type of ownership.
TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE VARIABLES OF TECHNOLOGY
Usage
CAS-accounts payable
CAS-payroll
CAS-accounts receivable
CAS-material’s order
CAS-fixed asset accounting
CAM-production scheduling
SYS-mater’l requir. plan. (MRP)
CAM-inventory order system
CAM-product tracking systems
CAP-systems resource alloc
CAD-electronic drafting boards
SYS-Expert Systems
ROB-other: sewing
CAM-other: punching press
CAM-other: typesetting
ROB-inspection
ROB-finishing
SYS-computer info. mgt. (CIM)
CAD-computer generated models
CAM —Flexible Manuf Sys (FMS)
CAS-other: fin. statements
LAS-other: typesetting
CAD-solid model capabilities
ROB-extendible arm
ROB-light assembly parts
LAS-material cutting
ROB-painting
ROB-palletizing
LAS-product inspection
ROB-small parts handling

Frequency

Percent

Rank

70
65
58
52
49
37
34
32
32
30
17
15
12
10
10
10
8
6
4
4
4
4
4
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

49
45
40
36
34
26
24
22
22
21
12
11
8
7
7
7
6
4
3
3
3
3
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 (tie)
8 (tie)
10
11
12
13
14 (tie)
14 (tie)
14 (tie)
17
18
19 (tie)
19 (tie)
19 (tie)
19 (tie)
19 (tie)
24 (tie)
24 (tie)
24 (tie)
24 (tie)
24 (tie)
24 (tie)
24 (tie)

NOTE:
CAD-Computer Assisted Design
CAM-Computer Assisted Manufacturing
CAP-Computer Assisted Production Planning
CAS-Computerized Accounting Systems
LAS-Lasers
ROB-Robotics
SYS-Overall Systems

Technology Usage
Firms in the sample were classified by their usage of tech
nology, measured by the total number of technology appli
cations each respondent checked. For a summary chart detail
ing frequency, percentage, and ranking of each technology
variable, see Table 1. From these data, three groups are iden
tified: low technology users, those with one or no use of tech
nology, (n = 56; 38%); medium technology users, two to six
uses, (n = 41; 29%); high technology users, seven or more uses
of technology (n=47; 33%).
Through the Delphi Technique, technology group cutoffs
were made. The cutoff of one use of technology for the low
tech group was made because the sample consisted of smaller
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firms with fewer resources, and one technology use indicated
the firm is experimenting with technology on a limited ba
sis. Seven uses of technology was used as the cutoff point for
the medium tech group because the Delphi Technique experts
feel that between two and six uses would fall primarily in the
computerization of accounting systems.
CAS applications such as accounts receivable, accounts
payable, materials purchasing, fixed asset accounting, and
payroll fall into the more conventional technology usages and
narrowly focus on one specific functional area. The high tech
nology users would have more than one category of technol
ogy, (e.g., CAS, CAD, CAM, robotics, lasers, overall systems
and CAP) and, therefore, more breadth in technological
sophistication. According to the Delphi Group, the greater
than seven uses cutoff means that the high tech firms are
adopting technologies in a wider range of functions.5
The results of the study confirm that the accounting func
tion is the first area impacted by new technologies in smaller
manufacturing firms. The accounting group (CAS) had the
top five rankings in technologies followed by the CAM and
SYS groups of characteristics, which included the sixth, sev
enth, and eighth most-used applications in technology (i.e.,
production scheduling, materials requirement planning,
product tracking, and inventory ordering systems). See Ta
ble 1.
Inhibitors
Another variable of strategic importance is inhibitors to
technology implementation. Respondents were asked to iden
tify all factors which they consider barriers to technology us
age. The top barriers (in rank order) are lack of capital in
vestment funds, lack of staff to investigate new technology,
satisfaction with present operations, lack of time to investigate
new systems, and lack of knowledge of available technology.
Amount of capitalization and availability of resources in small
businesses are common strategic issues which have been
linked empirically to the success or failure of a firm [1] [7] [22].
As Thompson [21] states in his research on cash flow manage
ment, “(The) vast majority of small firms are undercapital
ized.” The results of this study confirm previous research link
ing small size and the lack of capital investment funds.
However, studies show that small capitalization companies
have outperformed larger companies.6 Lyneis [10] found that
smaller firms adopt short-term financing strategies regard
ing lines of credit, accruals and accounts payable to adjust
for low capitalization. Weinstein [23] emphasized poor finan
cial control as a major factor contributing to business failure,
particularly in the areas of inventory, receivables, and
payables.
Other inhibiting factors to technology, which were rated
as moderate barriers, include lack of financial data, desire to
avoid debt, and the lack of the technology’s compatibility with
existing resources. Using the Delphi Group methodology, in
hibitors are also grouped into low (0-1), medium (2-6) and
high (7-16) categories. The low group cutoff of 1 is made to

assess firms which have a relatively barrier-free environment.
The medium group is characterized as the average. The cutoff
point of 6 is suggested because firms in this group would ex
perience a number of different barriers covering at least two
types of environmental areas. The high inhibitor group would
be differentiated from the low and medium groups with 7 or
more obstacles because they would report barriers in more
than two environmental areas (e.g., economic, political, finan
cial, human resources).
TABLE 2

TECHNOLOGY OF FIRMS AND INHIBITORS

FREQ
LOW TECH MEDIUM TECH HIGH TECH TOTAL
(COL %) FIRMS (0-1) FIRMS (2-6)
FIRMS (7-16)
LOW#
INHI

46
(82.1)

15
(36.6)

28
(59.6)

89
(61.9)

MED #
INHI
(2-6)

6
(10.7)

7
(17-1)

7
(14.9)

20
(13.2)

HIGH #
INHI
(7-16)

4
(7-1)

19
(46.3)

12
(25.5)

35
(24.9)

56
(100.0)

41
(100.0)

47
(100.0)

144
(100.0)

(o-i)

TOTAL

DEGREES OF FREEDOM - 8
CHI-SQUARE - 6.445
P<25

Table 2 indicates that low technology firms see fewer bar
riers to technology than do higher tech firms. Eighty-two per
cent perceive one or no barriers to the use of technology.
The responses of the medium and high technology firms,
on the other hand, are bimodal. They identify either few or
many inhibitors. In both cases, the firms use technology more
extensively, and the executives envision more barriers to new
technological implementation. Their view of barriers is more
formidable, but perhaps more realistic, than those firms
which are low technology users.

TABLE 4

TECHNOLOGY OF FIRMS AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE

FREQ
LOW TECH MEDIUM TECH HIGH TECH TOTAL
(COL %) FIRMS (0-1) FIRMS (2-6)
FIRMS (7-16)

TABLE 3
PERFORMANCE FACTORS

Description

Overall
Freq

Percent
%

Sample
Rank

Profit margin-O
Sales-O
ROI-O
Safety stock invy-T
WIP or finished goods invy-T
Market share-O
Rework costs-T
Scrap costs-T
Payroll costs-O
Accts receivable-O

41
40
36
32
32
28
22
22
20
8

29
28
25
22
22
19
15
15
14
6

2
3
4(t)
4 (0
6
7 (t)
7 (t)
9
10

NOTE:
T-Throughput performance variables
O-Output performance variables
t-Tie in ranking

Organizational Performance
Of the 10 financial performance factors studied in this re
search, profit margin is the top ranked factor, checked by 29
percent of the firms. The rankings are based on the number
of firms which check factors with a 3 (above average) perfor
mance rating relative to the industry. Other performance fac
tors which firms rated high in relative performance include
sales, ROI, and control of inventory costs for safety stock,
work in progress, and finished goods. In Table 3, frequency,
percent and rank are given for each performance variable
across the total firms sampled.
In this study the total number of performance indicators
for which firms rated above average relative performance is
calculated. Those with little or no (0-1) performance effects
were classified as low performers, those with a few perfor
mance improvements (2-3) as medium performers, and firms
with four or more performance indicators checked were clas
sified as high performers.
The rationale for a cutoff point of one for the low group
is similar to those for the inhibitor group, reflecting resource
constraints and minimal indicators of success. The medium
and high groups are distinguished at four since this points
to a more significant number of improvements. The medium
performing firms could conceivably focus their superior per
formance in one of the two performance groupings. This
would mean medium performers are not broad in the way
they measure performance (i.e., output versus throughput).
However, with the cutoff of four, the high-performing firms
are more likely to evidence performance as multibased and
inclusive of both output and throughput measures.
Results show a highly significant difference among the
three groups of technology users based on performance. (See
Table 4.) The group which has fewer improvements in per
formance is also the group which has little or no technology;
the medium technology users have a moderate number of

1(0

LOW
PERF
(o-i)

50
(89.3)

10
(24.4)

4
(9-3)

64
(44.4)

MED
PERF
(2-3)

2
(3-6)

5
(12.2)

5
(10.6)

12
(8.4)

HIGH
PERF
(4-10)

4
(7-1)

26
(63.4)

38
(90.1)

68
(47.2)

56
(100.0)

41
(100.0)

47
(100.0)

144
(100.0)

TOTAL

DEGREES OF FREEDOM = 8
CHI-SQUARE = 92.95
P< 0001
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performance enhancements. The firms experiencing the most
positive financial performance changes are the high tech user
firms.
This finding supports the focused work of Riggs and Bracker [16] which showed the linkage between computerized sys
tems limited to forecasting and aggregate planning and per
formance. It appears that small businesses which have
adapted to advanced technologies are reaping greater or
ganizational performance gains than firms which are adapt
ing more slowly or not at all. Schroeder et al. caution man
agers that adoption of technologies is not a panacea for solving
small business problems. Critical management in terms of
using the technologies for competitive advantage requires ad
vance planning.

Affinity to Computerization
Since the most common use of technologies appeared in the
Computerized Accounting System (CAS) group, a Pearson
correlation test was performed on the CAS variable in rela
tionship to the other technology categories. The results are
summarized in Table 5 and confirm significant relationships
between CAS and the remaining technology variables, with
the strongest associations between CAS and the two groups
of Computer-Assisted Manufacturing, CAM, (r=.549,
p < .0001) and Overall Systems, SYS, (r =.593, p < .0001) tech
nology. It seems likely that as firms adopt more technologies
in the computerized accounting area, they are also increas
ing their use of technology in other functional areas such as
production, management information systems, and new
product development.
TABLE 5
CORRELATION OF COMPUTER ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS
AND SPECIFIC TECHNOLOGIES
Description of
Technologies

Robotics
Computer Assisted Design
Computer Ass’d. Mfg.
Computer Ass’d. Prod. Plan.
Lasers
Overall Systems

Correlation
Coefficient

Significance
Level

.185
.355
.549
.321
.280
.593

.026
.001
.001
.001
.001
.001

Strategic Implications and Conclusions
Performance Implications
The strategic implication this research has for manufac
turing entrepreneurs is that production-based firms, which
have already adapted new technologies, are experiencing in
creased sales growth, improved market share, and greater
profitability as exhibited by higher return on investment and
return on sales ratios.
With respect to performance, it appears that technologies
such as robotization, manufacturing design, overall systems,
and computerization of accounting contribute most to posi
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tive changes. Entrepreneurs would do well to consider adop
tion of these technologies, particularly the most popular CAS
and CAM adaptations. The linkage of laser and CAP tech
nologies to performance is more perplexing. Although tech
nology in general is tied to performance, these two variables
do not conform to performance enhancement theory. Further
investigation of the reasons for these unexpected findings is
needed. Questions such as the time lag for implementation
of specific technologies and the relative costs need to be ad
dressed. Perhaps laser and CAP technologies have longerterm positive impacts on performance that do not show up
in this research, or there may be unspecified barriers to suc
cessful implementation of new laser and CAP technologies.
Strategic Implications —A Proactive Stance
In general, those firms which are slow to adapt to technol
ogies will be faced with poorer financial performance rela
tive to their competitors and thus placed at a competitive dis
advantage. The reactive “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” mode
with regard to usage of advanced technologies may be a very
risky strategy in an increasingly competitive and rapidly
changing environment. Davig [4] concurs in his research and
states that small business leaders who “Wait and see, then re
act” will probably be left behind.
Results of this study must be interpreted with caution due
to its exploratory nature, the limited geographical area sur
veyed, and the nature of self-report respondent ratings that
are not independently verified. Nevertheless, the results do
support suggestions of theorists who argue that strategies in
corporating technological adaptations are influencing greater
organizational effectiveness. O’Neill and Duker [14] reiter
ate this theme in their research and recommend new strate
gies that are based on the latest in technological advancement
because small businesses can no longer depend on business
practices that succeeded in the “good old days” for the turbu
lent environment which they are now facing.

Implications of Technology Inhibitors
This study shows that firms which have little or no tech
nological adoption see very few barriers to technology usage.
The managers of these firms seem more content with the pres
ent status of their firms, but also experience few positive
changes in performance. These findings are contrasted to the
firms which apply the new technologies more extensively.
High technology users view a substantial number of barri
ers to technology (including time, money, knowledge, and
staff constraints), yet these firms experience many indicators
of successful financial performance from lowered costs of work
in progress, finished goods and safety stock inventory, to in
crease in sales growth and profitability ratios. It seems that
entrepreneurs who adapt new technologies are realistic about
the problems that their small firms need to overcome; they
make changes in their technologies to improve efficiency and
profitability.
Additionally, this study provides evidence to government

and business policymakers, specifically those who influence
financial institutions, that a lack of investment capital is a ma
jor barrier for small manufacturers to adopting new technol
ogy. Programs aimed at small businesses for capital invest
ments in advanced technologies such as a small business
investment fund similar to that of mortgage funds for first
time home buyers, or centers of innovation grants which fund
small business projects involving technological adaptation,
would seem to make sense both economically and financially8
Small businesses are faced with a lack of resources, in terms
of time, staff, and financial resources, to investigate new sys
tems and to learn about technology that is available to them.
Governmental and higher education policymakers can re
spond to this need and provide technological assistance
through programs such as the Service Corps of Retired Ex
ecutives (SCORE), the Small Business Administration
(SBA), and Small Business Development Centers (SBDC),
as well as regional or local conferences and seminars centered
around new technologies (e.g., JIT, Expert Systems,
CAD/CAM and MRP) for small business owners and en
trepreneurs.
FOOTNOTES
A. more detailed account of numerical control technology can be found in
Matthew J. Liberatore and George J. Titus, “The Use of Computer Con
trolled Tools By Small Machine Shops ?Journal ofSmall Business Manage
ment (January 1986), pp. 55-62, and “Machine Tools and Accessories”
U.S. Industrial Outlook 1985 Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Print
ing Office, pp. 20-28.
2The trend of small businesses in a “high-tech world” is described more fully
by Douglas J. Lincoln and William B. Warburg [9].
3For further discussion of all six planning activities that were critical to small
firms, see R.B. Robinson, Jr., M. Salem, J.E. Logan and J.A. Pearce,
II, “Planning Activities Related to Independent Retail Firm Perfor
mance,” American Journal of Small Business (Summer 1986), pp. 19-26.
4For an in-depth analysis of the Dess and Robinson [5] method of measur
ing financial performance, please see Sapienza et al. [18].
5In the article “Factory of the Future: A Survey,” The Economist, May 30, 1987,
p. 14, innovative firms were found to computerize their machine tools
first, then to streamline their scheduling departments and lastly, to link
the two departments together.
6See Hubert J. Dwyer and Richard Lynn, “Small Capitalization Compa
nies: What Does Financial Analysis Tell Us About Them?” The Finan
cial Review, 24 August 1989, pp. 397-415 for a discussion of the sources
of superior performance by small capitalization companies. Also see
[10] and [21].
7Recommendations from DM. Schroeder, SW. Congden and C. Gopinath
[19] include planning the requirements of new technology adoption,
matching the firm’s strengths with the technology choice, and prepar
ing contingency plans for implementation obstacles.
8Another solution to the problem of undercapitalization is the development
of institutional venture capital groups such as 3i, formerly called In
vestors in Industry Group PLC, which was set up in the United King
dom. See Meir Ramari’s “Financing High Tech In Small Firms,” The
Bankers Magazine, March-April 1986, pp. 52-55 for more details.

REFERENCES

[1] Boardman, DM., J.W. Barteley, and R.L. Tarliff, “Small Business
Growth Characteristics,” Management Accounting 5, January-March 1981,
pp. 33-43.
[2] Burrows, Brian C., “Computer-Aided Design and Manufacturing A Manager’s Guide,” Long Range Planning, October 1986, pp. 76-83.
[3] “Can America Make It?: Rebuilding the U.S. Model,” Financial Times,
May 9, 1987, p. 26.
[4] Davig, William, “Business Strategies In Smaller Manufacturing
Firms,” Journal of Small Business, January 1986, pp. 46-48.
[5] Dess, G.G. and R.B. Robinson, “Measuring Organizational Perfor
mance In The Absence of Objective Measures: The Case Of The Pri
vately Held Firm and Conglomerate Business Unit,” Strategic Manage
ment Journal 5, 1984, pp. 265-273.
[6] Dumaine, Brian, “How Managers Can Succeed Through Speed,” For
tune, February 13, 1989, pp. 54-58.
[7] Ibrahim, A. and J. Goodwin, “Perceived Causes of Success In Small
Business,” American Journal of Small Business 2, Fall 1986, pp. 46-53.
[8] Kipp, H.O., “Ready for Robots?” Dun and Bradstreet Reports, July-August
1983, pp. 14-16.
[9] Lincoln, Douglas, and William Warberg, “The Role of Microcom
puters In Small Business Marketing ” Journal of Small Business Manage
ment, April 1987, pp. 8-17.
[10] Lyneis, J.L. “Designing Policies to Deal with Limited Financial Re
sources,” Financial Management, Spring 1975, pp. 59-66.
[11] Malone, Stewart, “Computerizing Small Business Information Sys
tems,” Journal of Small Business Management, April 1985, pp. 10-18.
[12] Mitchell, R.H., “Robotics For Smaller Manufacturers: Myths and
Realities,” Business Horizons, July-August 1986, pp. 9-18.
[13] Olson, Philip, D, “Entrepreneurs: Opportunistic Decision Makers,”
Journal of Small Business Management, July 1986, pp. 29-35.
[14] O’Neill, Hugh M., and Jacob Duker, “Survival and Failure in Small
Business,”Journal of Small Business Management, January 1986, pp. 30-37.
[15] Peters, Tom, Thriving On Chaos: Handbookfor a Management Revolution. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987.
[16] Riggs, Walter E. and Jeffrey S. Bracker, “Operations Management
and Financial Performance,” American Journal of Small Business, Winter
1986, pp. 17-23.
[17] Safizadeh, M. Hossien, F. Raafat, and C.H. Davis, “On The Impli
cations of Information Processing Tools For Small Businesses,” Inter
national Journal of Management, September 1986, pp. 73-80.
[18] Sapienza, Harry J., Ken G. Smith, and Martin J. Gannon, “Using
Subjective Evaluations of Organizational Performance in Small Busi
ness Research,” American Journal ofSmall Business, Winter 1988, pp. 45-53.
[19] Schroeder, DM., S.W. Congden, and C. Gopinath, “New Technology
and the Small Manufacturer"Journal ofSmall Business Management, Vol.
27 No. 3, July 1989, pp. 1-10.
[20] Sullivan, Jeremiah J. and Gretchen O. Shively, “Expert System Soft
ware In Small Business Decision Making,” Journal of Small Business
Management, January 1989, pp. 26-32.
[21] Thompson, Ray, “Understanding Cash Flow: A System Dynamics
Analysis,” Journal of Small Business Management, April 1988, pp. 23-30.
[22] Van Auken, Howard E., “Acquisition of Capital By Small Business,”
TheJournal of Financial and Strategic Decisions 2, Spring 1989, pp. 99-110.
[23] Weinstein, H.N., “An Analysis of Business Failure and Financial Con
trol Processes,” Journal of Accountancy, December 1982, pp. 12-16.

23

from page 13

Whereas in the 1963 uprising, university and high school
students had been reluctant to join forces with men they
regarded as religious reactionaries, such students did join
forces with Khomeini and his more traditional supporters in
1978-79. One reason for this was that an Iranian intellectual
named Ali SharFati, who had a Ph.D. from the Sorbonne,
had disseminated a kind of Islamic “liberation theology” in
the 1960s and early 1970s. In his writings, Shari"ati urged
westernized Iranians to return to their true Islamic identity
rather than mimic the West. He also argued that Islam, and
ShiJ Islam in particular, was an inherently revolutionary
ideology. Thus Iranian students had no need to turn to Marx
ism - which did in fact appeal to many Iranian students. This
line of reasoning, which involved Marxist reinterpretations
of Islam very similar to “liberation” Christianity in Latin
America, led many students to repudiate “the western ideol
ogy of Marxism” and return to Islam - or at any rate to the
ideologized Islam of Shari'ati (which was far removed from
the popular religion of the peasants - who did not participate
in Iran’s revolution).
While many Iranian religious scholars ( ^idama) con
demned SharCati’s revolutionary interpretation of Islam, it
played a pivotal role in the revolution that brought these same
scholars to power. The students and other young intellectu
als committed to SharCati’s ideas saw Khomeini as the em
bodiment of their revolutionary Islam, while ignoring the
more “fundamentalist” themes in the Ayatollah’s writings.
Many of these young people were later “devoured” by the revo
lution they helped bring about.
Together, Khomeini and Shari'ati provided the Iranian
revolution with its ideology. Khomeini also provided it with
leadership. The revolution was not simply the result of a care
fully planned plot hatched by the Ayatollah and his cronies.
The Iranian revolution, like all revolutions, was due to un

planned discontents and crises as well as planned attempts
to exploit them.
Khomeini, who remained in Iraq during most of the revo
lution, appears to have been as surprised by the upheaval of
1978-79, at least initially, as Lenin was by the February revo
lution of 1917. Khomeini did not plan Carter’s human rights
policy or the Shah’s relative liberalization (not to mention the
Shah’s cancer). Nor did he plan the “public letters” of the secu
lar intellectuals in 1977. Nor did he plan the publication in
January 1978 of an inflammatory article vilifying him as a
sexual deviant employed by the British. The Shah’s own Min
ister of Information ordered the publication of this article,
which sparked the cycle of protest, martyrdom, and mourn
ing that eventually coalesced into the revolution. Nor did
Khomeini plan his expulsion from Iraq and flight to France
in October of 1978, which enabled him to communicate with
Iran and the world more effectively than he ever had before.
This was the Shah’s idea. Khomeini’s role as a leader was un
questionably of major importance by the late summer of 1978,
when his refusal to compromise with the Shah entailed the
latte?s downfall. But in the revolution’s embryonic stages, he
was most important as a multifaceted symbol around which
the various strands of the opposition could rally.
In short then, to view Iran’s Islamic revolution as merely
a reactionary response to the Shah’s overly rapid moderni
zation is mistaken. While there was a reactionary dimension
to Khomeini’s “fundamentalism,” there was also a clearly na
tionalistic dimension to the Iranian revolution that the Ameri
can mass media have tended to ignore. Nationalistic resent
ment of foreign influence in Iran did not suddenly emerge
in 1978-79, nor was such resentment a uniquely Iranian
phenomenon. Iranian perceptions of the Carter human rights
policy and the Shah’s relative liberalization in 1977 en
couraged Iranians to articulate this resentment, as well as
resentment of the Shah’s repressive regime and other griev
ances. Khomeini, by virtue of his religious authority as well
as his own personal charisma, came to symbolize these griev
ances and eventually took control of the popular protests that
brought down the Shah.

from page 17
him a “world war,” and which he spent the better part of his
adult life observing. At the beginning of the war, Athenian
democracy is flourishing, Athens enjoys unparalleled hegem
ony in the Greek world. A quarter century later, the regime
has collapsed, the empire lies in ruins.
The political problems that democracies face trying to pre
serve their ideals and institutions in a world hostile to both
are elaborated by Thucydides with unsurpassed lucidity. Are
we today interested in problems of democratic leadership? Of
reconciling the self-interest of individual citizens and the pub
lic interest? Are we concerned with the intricacies of relations
between domestic structure and foreign policy? How
democracies can successfully retain the concepts of political

legitimacy on which they are based, and at the same time gar
ner and maintain the will to act assertively in the international
arena? In short, do we wish to understand how democracies
perish? Such questions, unfortunately, are not academic for
us. And Thucydides’ narrative provides classic answers.
This essay leaves to others, however, the task of applying
the universal political lessons of Thucydides to the particu
lar political crises of the day. Throughout, I aspire to emu
late Thucydides by entering into his heart no further than the
text itself evidently guides me; to follow where compulsion
leads, not where honor or interest may suggest; in the words
of Thomas Hobbes, to let the narration itself secretly instruct
the reader, and more effectually than can possibly be done
by precept.

vulnerability in the late seventies, Khomeini’s role as revolu
tionary symbol, and later as revolutionary leader, was cer
tainly crucial.
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